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Services for Private School Students
Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act:
Issues of Statutory Entitlement, Religious Liberty,
and Procedural Regularity
Abstract
Government support for private schooling has been a topic of public discussion
from the beginning of the administration of President George Bush. The Individuals with
Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004 (“Improvement Act”) amends the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) with regard to (among other
things) publicly funded services for children with disabilities who attend private schools.
This Article describes the private school student provisions of the new law,
demonstrating that the Improvement Act represents continuity in the field of special
education services for children in private education. The Article then takes up three
issues regarding services for private school children: (1) The existence of any individual
entitlement that private school children and their parents may have to any particular level
of publicly funded special education services; (2) Whether denial of equal, or even of
any, services to some private school children unconstitutionally burdens free exercise of
religion or parents’ rights to control their children’s upbringing; and (3) The risk of
arbitrary decision making in allocating services among private school children. With
regard to the first issue, this Article demonstrates that Congress has not created any
enforceable individual entitlement to special education services for any given private
school child. Some states, however, have established an individual entitlement.
Regarding the second problem, this Article concludes that it is constitutionally
permissible for public schools to refuse to fully subsidize private school children’s
special education services; any contrary view would expand constitutional rights to
public services of private school children and their parents beyond acceptable bounds.
Regarding the third problem, this Article advances the position that the Improvement Act
creates risks of arbitrary and unfair allocations of services that are unacceptably high, and
that under due process principles, transparency of the allocation process needs to be
guaranteed.
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Services for Private School Students
Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act:
Issues of Statutory Entitlement, Religious Liberty,
and Procedural Regularity
Some suspect a hidden agenda.1 For others, the agenda is anything but hidden:
The Bush administration favors private schooling.2 The federal budget proposal released
in March, 2006 offered $100 million in funding for $4,000 private school scholarships
and $3,000 tutoring grants for students in underperforming public schools.3 Last fall, the
administration proposed that $500 million be spent on private school tuition for students
displaced by the Hurricane Katrina disaster.4 The President himself has consistently
supported voucher programs to pay the tuition of students at private elementary and
secondary schools.5 The No Child Left Behind initiative, which is the centerpiece of the
administration’s effort on education, requires remedial activity for schools whose
students, including defined subgroups of students, do not make adequate yearly progress
towards standards of proficiency.6 The actions include permissive transfers,
supplemental private services, and ultimately, school reorganization that may entail

1

See, e.g., Robert Rubinstein, Bush’s Plan to Destroy Our Public Schools, Z Magazine Online, at
http://zmagsite.zmag.org/Oct2004/rubinsteinpr1004.html (Oct. 2004) (last visited Mar. 22, 2006) (calling
No Child Left Behind law “based on lies and deceit”).
2
See, e.g., Mark Noonan, The Argument for School Choice, Blogs for Bush, at
http://www.blogsforbush.com/mt/archives/006615.html (Mar. 2, 2006) (stating that public schools prove
deficient in instilling character and teaching basics and advocating Bush administration educational choice
initiatives).
3
Robert Holland, Bush Budget Calls for Private School Scholarships, Sch. Reform News, at
http://www.heartland.org/Article.cfm?artId=18626 (last visited on Mar. 1, 2006).
4
Nick Anderson, Bush Proposes Private School Relief Plan, WASH. POST, Sep. 17, 2005 at A12, available
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/16/AR2005091601723_pf.html.
5
Bush Repeats Support for School Vouchers, CNN.com, at
http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/02/13/bush.vouchers.ap/ (Feb. 13, 2004).
6
20 U.S.C.A. § 6311(b)(2)(C)(v)(II)(cc) (West 2006).

ceding operations to an outside provider of services.7 The private-education nature of
these steps has led to sharp accusations that the real goal of No Child Left Behind is to
undermine public education and promote private schools.8
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act (“Improvement
Act”),9 passed in December of 2004, reauthorizes and amends the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”).10 IDEA is the basic federal legislation that
furnishes assistance to states and school districts for providing special education to
students with disabilities. It requires states and school districts to guarantee free,

7

20 U.S.C.A. § 6316(b) (West 2006). Invoking the No Child Left Behind law, Maryland has announced it
will take over operations of seven Baltimore middle schools and will reopen them either as charter schools
or schools run by private entities under state supervision. Diana Jean Schemo, Maryland Acts to Take Over
Failing Baltimore Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2006, at A14, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/30/education/30child.html?_r=1&oref=slogin.
8
See Bess Keller, Weaver Calls on Delegates to Make Covenant with Nation, EDUCATION WEEK, July 13,
2005, at 16 (“Mr. Weaver called on the delegates in his July 3 keynote speech to unite to ‘defend public
education and public school educators against the negative, mean-spirited, contrived attacks aimed at under
mining and derailing the great institution of public education, while advancing the agenda of privatizing,
charterizing, and voucherizing for personal gain.’”); see also Sam Dillon, Some School Districts Challenge
Bush’s Signature Education Law, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2004, at A1 (“[I]n the presidential campaign,
criticism of the new law by Howard Dean, the former governor of Vermont, and other candidates has been
drawing an enthusiastic response. School boards, Dr. Dean told a New Hampshire town meeting recently,
call the law ‘no school boards left standing.’”); Council of Chief State School Officers, Vouchers and
Choice, at http://www.ccsso.org/federal_programs/vouchers_and_choice/1650.cfm (visited Aug. 8, 2005)
(expressing opposition to unsuccessful voucher proposals previously attached to No Child Left Behind bill
and questioning measures contained in law as passed); National Education Association, “No Child Left
Behind” Act/ESEA, at http://www.nea.org/esea/index.html (visited Aug. 8, 2005) (“The No Child Left
Behind (NCLB) Act of 2001 (the latest revision of ESEA) presents real obstacles to helping students and
strengthening public schools because it focuses on: punishments rather than assistance[;] rigid, unfunded
mandates rather than support for proven practices[;] bureaucracy and standardized testing rather than
teacher-led, classroom focused solutions.”).
9
Pub. L. No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647 (2004) (codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400-1487).
In this Article, citations are to the relevant sections of 20 U.S.C.A. as amended by the Improvement Act.
For a general discussion of this statute see Mark C. Weber, Reflections on the New Individuals with
Disabilities Education Improvement Act, 58 FLA. L. REV. 7 (2006). Most provisions took effect on July 1,
2005. Pub. L. No. 108-446 § 302(a) (2004) (making statute effective immediately with regard to definition
of highly qualified special education teachers and effective July 1, 2005 with regard to other provisions).
The Department of Education issued final regulations under the law on August 14, 2006, effective 60 days
after that publication date. Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities and
Preschool Grants for Children with Disabilities (hereinafter “Final Rules”), 71 Fed. Reg. 46540 (Aug. 14,
2006). Despite the possibility of well-founded doubt over the truthfulness of the new statute’s title, this
Article will use the term “Improvement Act” to refer to the new law.
10
20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400-1487 (West 2006).
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appropriate public education to all school-aged children who have disabilities.11 One of
the stated goals of the Improvement Act is to coordinate special education with the No
Child Left Behind effort,12 so it is hardly surprising that the Act addresses the availability
of services for children with disabilities whose parents have voluntarily placed them in
private schools. Remarkably, however, the amended provisions relating to private
schools do not increase funding of services for children attending school in those settings.
They do not create a federal voucher program for students with special education needs.13
Instead, the Improvement Act preserves the essence of the most recent (1997) revision of
IDEA as it relates to children placed by their parents in private schools for religious or
other personal reasons.14 In some places, the Improvement Act codifies rules previously
established by regulation, modifying them only slightly.15 Most significantly, the
Improvement Act does not explicitly establish any individual entitlement to special
education services for any private school child, nor does it require that services provided
to private school children be delivered on the site of the private schools or by means of
private school personnel.16 It affords few procedural rights to parents of private school
children to challenge decisions about services.17 The private schools provisions of the

11

See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(1) (West 2006) (requiring participating states to ensure that free, appropriate
public education is made available to all age-eligible children with disabilities).
12
See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400(c)(5)(C) (West 2006) (claiming benefits from coordinating IDEA with No Child
Left Behind provisions).
13
Regarding such a proposal at the state level, see Maria Glod & Rosalind S. Helderman, Tuition Grants
Considered for Disabled Va. Students, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 2006, at B04, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/01/AR2006030102122_pf.html.
14
See infra text accompanying notes 47-93. For a comprehensive discussion of the pre-2004 private school
provisions and litigation regarding them, see MARK C. WEBER, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW AND LITIGATION
TREATISE § 6.3 (2d ed. 2002 & supp. III 2005).
15
See infra text accompanying notes 70-92.
16
See infra text accompanying notes 94-99, 152-164.
17
See infra text accompanying notes 150-151.
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new law thus do not represent a major victory for those with a pro-private school
agenda.18
A primary purpose of this Article is to make and support the point just advanced,
the descriptive claim that the Improvement Act represents continuity in the field of
special education services for children in private education. Emerging from the
description, however, are three additional problems: (1) The existence (or non-existence)
of any individual entitlement that private school children and their parents may have to
any level of publicly funded special education services; (2) The question whether denial
of equal, or even of any, services to some private school children unconstitutionally
burdens free exercise of religion or parents’ autonomy to control their children’s
upbringing; and (3) The risk of arbitrary decision making in allocating services among
private school children. The first problem is resolved by statutory construction and
regulatory interpretation; this Article will demonstrate that under current law, as under
prior law, Congress has not created any enforceable individual entitlement to special
education services for any given private school child. Interestingly, however, some states
have established an individual entitlement, and this Article will catalogue the authorities
setting out such a right. The second problem is resolved by asking whether the burden on
free exercise and parental control worked by denial of equal support for private school
children in need of special education is a penalty for exercise of rights to educate children
in private and religious institutions, or merely a refusal to subsidize that choice. This
18

Related to the debate over support of private schools is the creation of charter schools. See generally
Elissa Gootman, Public vs. Private Schools: A New Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2006, at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/05/education/05charter.html (reporting controversy over placement of
new charter schools in public school buildings). The Individuals with Disabilities Act regulations generally
treat charter schools as public schools, and so charter schools fall outside the scope of this Article’s
discussion. See generally 34 C.F.R. § 300.241 (2005) (establishing school district duties with respect to
public charter schools).
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Article will conclude that it is a constitutionally permissible refusal to provide a subsidy
and will suggest that the contrary view would expand constitutional rights of private
school children to public services beyond acceptable bounds. The third problem remains
a problem. The absence of an individual entitlement and procedural rights means that
there is little in the way of a check on public school decisions to allocate or withhold
services. The law presents risks of discrimination among identically situated private
school children, and of arbitrary decision making in general. IDEA affords group
consultation rights,19 but these are a poor substitute for a guarantee of regularity in the
provision of needed government services. This Article does not advocate increased
special education services for children in private schools, but it advances the position that
procedural regularity of the system needs to be guaranteed.
Many writers have commented on the general topic of subsidies for private
schooling, particularly religious schooling.20 Others have discussed the First Amendment
establishment clause issue with specific regard to on-site special education services.21 A
few have discussed issues of statutory interpretation entailed in providing special
19

See infra text accompanying notes 70-83.
E.g., Goodwin Liu & William L. Taylor, School Choice to Achieve Desegregation, 74 FORDHAM L. REV.
791 (2005); Sean T. McLaughlin, Some Strings Attached? Federal Private School Vouchers and the
Regulation Carousel, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 857 (2003); Molly Townes O’Brien, Private School Tuition
Vouchers and the Realities of Racial Politics, 64 TENN. L. REV. 359 (1997). A large number of sources
discuss the topic in connection with the First Amendment religion clauses. E.g., Richard Albert, Popular
Will and the Establishment Clause: Rethinking Public Funding to Religious Schools, 35 U. MEM. L. REV.
199 (2005); Mark J. Chadsey, State Aid to Religious Schools: From Everson to Zelman: A Critical Review,
44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 699 (2004). Charles Fried, Five to Four: Reflections on the School Voucher
Case, 116 HARV. L. REV. 163 (2002); Frank S. Ravitch, Locke v. Davey and the Lose-Lose Scenario: What
Davey Could Have Said But Didn’t, 40 TULSA L. REV. 255 (2004); Hannah M. Rogers, School Vouchers: A
Solution to an Educational Crisis or Impermissible Government Involvement in Religion?, 52 DRAKE L.
REV. 821 (2004); Steven D. Smith, The Iceberg of Religious Freedom: Sub-Surface Levels of
Nonestablishment Discourse, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 799 (2005); Sarah Waszmer, Note, Taking It Out of
Neutral: Application of Locke’s Substantial Interest Test to the School Voucher Debate, 62 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1271 (2005). For an interesting discussion that challenges conventional wisdom on the private
school-public school issue, see James Forman, Jr., The Secret History of School Choice: How Progressives
Got There First, 93 GEO. L.J. 1287 (2005).
21
Ronald D. Wenkart, The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act and the Establishment Clause of the
United States Constitution, 23 WHITTIER L. REV. 411 (2001).
20
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education services for students in private schools under local voucher programs22 and
under the 1997 IDEA private school provisions.23 This Article brings the discussion
about the meaning of the private school provisions up to date and clarifies the
background against which the larger debates over support for students in private school
will continue to take place. It treats in detail the question of individual entitlement to
services under federal and state law. It then raises, and tries to dispose of, the debate
about religious free exercise and parental autonomy issues,. It also presents the issue of
arbitrariness in decisions about allocation of private school services and argues that
greater protection needs to be afforded parents.
Part I of this Article will explain the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
and note some of the changes made by the Improvement Act. In Part II, this Article will
give an overview of the current statutory and regulatory regime governing services for
children with disabilities in private schools. Part III will take up the specific issue of
individual entitlement of private school children to special education services, discussing
sources both in federal and state law; it will further discuss rights to on-site services and
the eligibility of home-schooled students for publicly funded special education. Part IV

22

Shannon S. Taylor, Special Education, Private Schools, and Vouchers: Do All Students Get a Choice?,
34 J.L. & EDUC. 1 (2005); William N. Myhill, Note, No FAPE for Children with Disabilities in the
Milwaukee Parental Choice Program: Time to Redefine a Free Appropriate Public Education, 89 IOWA L.
REV. 1051 (2004).
23
William L. Dowling, Comment, Special Education and the Private School Student: The Mistake of the
IDEA Amendments Act, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 79 (1997); Jennifer A. Knox, Comment, The IDEA Amendments
of 1997 and the Private Schools Provision: Seeking Improved Special Education, but Serving Only a Select
Few, 49 CATH. U.L. REV. 201 (1999). Several writers have discussed home schooling in connection with
the 1997 IDEA private school provisions. Samuel Ashby Lambert, Note, Finding the Way Back Home:
Funding for Home School Children Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 101 COLUM. L.
REV. 1709 (2001); Lisa R. Knickerbocker, Note, The Education of All Children with Disabilities:
Integrating Home-Schooled Children into the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 62 OHIO ST. L.J.
1515 (2001); Sheila Youngberg, Note, Hooks v. Clark County School District: IDEA and the New
Inequality—The Denial of Subsidized Services to Privately Schooled Children with Disabilities, 24
WHITTIER L. REV. 597 (2002). For a discussion of home schooling issues, see infra text accompanying
notes 170-182.
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will discuss the case law concerning First Amendment and constitutional rights of
parental control of children’s upbringing in connection with the denial of special
education services to students of religious and other private schools. In Part V, the
Article will describe the aspects of the law that create risks of arbitrary decision making,
and argue that in order to be consistent with basic principles of due process, public school
districts need to take steps beyond the minimal ones set out in the statute to guarantee fair
treatment of private school students and their families.
I. THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act provides significant federal
funding for the special education efforts of states that agree to provide all children with
disabilities a free, appropriate public education.24 States and local school districts that
receive the money assume not only the general obligation of providing an appropriate
education to all children with disabilities, but also the duty to provide services related to
education, such as transportation, physical and occupational therapy, sign language
interpretation, and others.25 Children with disabilities are to be educated, to the
maximum extent appropriate, with children who do not have disabilities, and
supplementary aids and services must be furnished to avoid the need for removal from
regular classes.26
Parents of children with disabilities have extensive rights of participation in the
creation of the individualized education program that sets out the services to be delivered

24

See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1411(i) (West 2006) (authorizing appropriations).
See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(26) (West 2006) (defining “related services”).
26
20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(5) (West 2006).
25
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to the child.27 They may exercise rights to challenge the program or other aspects of the
provision or denial of educational services by demanding an adversarial “due process
hearing” and either they or the school district may appeal the result of the hearing to
court.28 These mechanisms to insure that the law is enforced in each individual case and
that decision making by schools is transparent were key features of the 1975 law, and
demonstrated a “congressional emphasis” on participation rights and procedural
regularity.29 Two federal cases that strongly influenced Congress in its drafting of the
law had upheld equal protection claims against denial of services to children with
disabilities in public schools and procedural due process claims against exclusion from
public school without notice and the opportunity to be heard.30
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act is the name Congress gave the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 when it enacted the amendments of
1990.31 The 1975 law32 culminated years of efforts to establish federal assistance for
education of children with disabilities, and introduced an individual, legally enforceable
entitlement to education and related services for all children who met a disability
27

See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(d) (West 2006) (requiring opportunity for parental participation in devising
individualized education program).
28
20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(f)-(i) (West 2006). The child remains in the existing placement during the pendency
of proceedings. § 1415(j). Attorneys’ fees are available to parents if they are successful. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(F) The law also provides rights to challenge long-term suspensions, expulsions, or other removals from
school imposed on children with disabilities. § 1415(k).
29
See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 476 U.S. 176, 206 (1982); see also id. at 205 (“Congress placed . . .
emphasis on compliance with procedures giving parents and guardians a large measure of participation at
every stage of the administrative process . . . .”).
30
Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972); Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Children (P.A.R.C.) v.
Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971), 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972). The Supreme Court
commented on the importance of these cases to the formation of the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act in Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192-93.
31
Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1103 (1990). The term “handicapped” had become disfavored, and many
in the disabilities rights movement favored placing the noun “person” or “individual” first and the “with
disabilities” modifier later, in order to emphasize that a person with a disability is a human being rather
than a manifestation of an impairment. See Illinois Attorney General, Disability Rights: Manual of Style
for Depicting People with Disabilities, at http://www.ag.state.il.us/rights/manualstyle.html (visited Mar.
31, 2006).
32
Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975).
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standard and were in need of special education. Although some states and localities were
educating children with disabilities and receiving limited federal special education
funding to do so, as of 1975 approximately 1.75 million children with disabilities were
excluded from public school and 2.5 million were in programs that did not meet their
needs.33
The special education law came into place against a background of broader
federal efforts to end discrimination against persons with disabilities. In 1973, Congress
passed section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which forbids discrimination against
persons with disabilities by recipients of federal funding.34 Since state educational
agencies and local school districts receive federal money, section 504 confers rights to
nondiscrimination in education on children who have disabilities.35 In 1990, Congress
passed title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, which bars discrimination against
persons with disabilities by units of state and local government (again including state
educational agencies and local school districts), creating yet another remedy for disability
discrimination in education.36
The Education for All Handicapped Children Act originally required states to
make provision for participation in special education by students enrolled in private
schools by their parents, to the extent consistent with the number and location of the
33

H.R. REP. NO. 94-332, at 11-12 (1975).
29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West 2006).
35
Generally speaking, the coverage of section 504 and title II of the ADA is broader than that of IDEA, and
accordingly those nondiscrimination laws protect some children who do not meet the narrower definition of
eligible children found in IDEA in addition to protecting those who do. See MARK C. WEBER, RALPH
MAWDSLEY & SARAH REDFIELD, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 58 (2005) (explaining
eligibility distinctions). For a discussion of several difficult eligibility issues under IDEA, see Robert A.
Garda, Untangling Eligibility Requirements Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 69 MO.
L. REV. 441 (2004).
36
See generally Mark C. Weber, Disability Discrimination by State and Local Government: The
Relationship Between Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1089 (1995) (comparing section 504 and title II).
34
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children.37 In 1997, however, Congress tightened and supplemented the statutory
language to require that amounts expended by school districts for the provision of
services to private school students equal the amount of federal funds that would be
proportionate to the number of private school children residing in the district.38 The 1997
law further stated that services could be provided “on the premises of private, including
parochial, schools, to the extent consistent with the law.”39 The 1997 Amendments also
codified case law that allowed hearing officers to require school districts to reimburse
parents for tuition at private schools when the parents placed their children there because
the public schools failed to offer the children a free, appropriate public education.40 The
statute distinguished this right to tuition funding that arises because of the parents’
victory in a dispute over the content of public school special education programming
from the provision of services to children whose parents placed their children in private
school for other reasons, such as family preference or religion.41 The tuition

37

20 U.S.C. § 1412 (1976).
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37
(codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1487). The private school student provisions were codified at 20 U.S.C.A.
§ 1412(a)(10)(A) (West 1998).
39
20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(10)(A)(i)(II) (West 1998).
40
20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii)-(iv) (West 1998). This provision codified cases approving tuition
reimbursement relief such as Burlington School Committee v. Department of Education, 471 U.S. 359
(1985), and Florence County School District Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993), but it made the entitlement
to relief dependent on various conditions. A court has recently ruled that the statutory right to
reimbursement is not an exclusive remedy, and that reimbursement may be ordered in other circumstances.
M.M. v. Sch. Bd., 437 F.3d 1085, 1099 (11th Cir. 2006). But see Greenland Sch. Dist. v. Amy M., 358
F.3d 150 (1st Cir. 2004) (denying reimbursement when parents failed to follow all conditions specified in
statute, but holding open possibility of reimbursement in extreme cases).
41
The provision most frequently comes into play when the parents believe that a school district’s program
of services for their child lack sufficient intensity and place their child in a private therapeutic school or
similar specialized educational institution. See cases cited supra note 40. Nevertheless, in some instances,
courts have approved reimbursement even though the private school chosen by the parents did not provide
special education services. E.g., Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 418 F. Supp. 2d 559 (S.D.N.Y.
2006) (requiring reimbursement of private school tuition when private school lacked special education
services but provided environment free from disability harassment). Even these latter instances are ones in
which an underlying dispute exists over the appropriateness of special education services offered by the
public schools. Of course, it is possible in some situations that the parents may also desire the private
38
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reimbursement provision warned that subject to the specific subparagraph of the statute
covering the obligation to provide for participation of private school students and allot
proportionate funding,
[T]his part does not require a local educational agency [the statute’s term
for a school district or its equivalent] to pay for the cost of education,
including special education and related services, of a child with a
disability at a private school or facility if that agency made a free
appropriate public education available to the child and the parents elected
to place the child in such private school or facility.42
Thus the participation and proportionate funding provisions were the only clear basis in
federal law to obtain support from the public schools for special education of children
placed by their parents in private schools for family reasons.
The President signed the latest statute amending the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act, on
December 3, 2004.43 The Improvement Act left the basic provisions of IDEA intact, but
added requirements regarding highly qualified teachers, student assessment, and the other
trappings of the No Child Left Behind effort.44 It also permitted some federal special
education funding to be used for intervention services for children not yet determined to
have a qualifying disability.45 It changed eligibility determination rules for children with

schooling for reasons of religion or other considerations not related to the appropriateness of the special
education services offered in the public schools.
42
20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(i) (West 1998).
43
Acts Approved by the President, 40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2936 (Dec. 13, 2004).
44
See, e.g., 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1401(10)(B) (defining highly qualified teachers), 1412(a)(16) (governing
participation in assessments by children with disabilities) (West 2006).
45
§ 1413(f).
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learning disabilities.46 It altered dispute resolution procedures and judicial review rights
and limited the ability to contest disciplinary decisions. And, of course, it changed the
provisions relating to services for children placed voluntarily by their parents in private
schools.
II. THE STATUTORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR PRIVATE SCHOOL STUDENT
SERVICES UNDER THE IMPROVEMENT ACT
Regarding private school student services, the statutory and regulatory framework
of the new law encompasses two principal areas: first, school districts’ responsibilities to
allocate federal funding and identify, locate, and evaluate private school children who
may be eligible for services; and second, the obligations of the districts to consult with
private school representatives and to plan for service delivery.
A.

Allocation of Funds and Responsibilities for Student Evaluation
Under the Improvement Act, every school district must allocate funding to the

education of private school children with disabilities in the amount of federal IDEA Part
B dollars proportionate to the number of children enrolled in private schools within the
district.47 A child-find process must be used, in consultation with private school
representatives, to determine the number of children with disabilities in private schools,
in order to determine the proportionate amount to be allocated.48 The allocations are to
be proportionate to the number of private school children being educated in the district,
rather than the number of private school students residing there.49 State and local funds

46

§ 1414(b)(6)(A).
§ 1412(a)(10)(A)(i)(I). Part B of the Act, 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1411-1419 (West 2006), covers services for
school-aged and preschool-aged children with disabilities. Part A, §§ 1400-1409, contains general
provisions, and Part C, §§ 1431-1444, covers infant and toddler programs.
48
§ 1412(a)(10)(A)(i)-(ii).
49
§ 1412(a)(10)(A)(i).

47
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may supplement the school district’s allocation of federal money.50 The district is
obliged to maintain records of the number of private school children evaluated, those
determined to be children with disabilities, and those served; the district must submit
those records to the state educational agency.51 The child-find process must be designed
to insure that children in private schools are accurately identified; the activities are to be
similar to those used for public school children.52 Child-find may be costly, but the costs
cannot be considered as part of the proportionate amount calculation.53 Promptness
matters. The process must be completed in a time period comparable to that for students
attending public schools in the district.54
The part of this that is new is the requirement that schools identify, evaluate, and
spend a proportionate amount of their federal dollars on students attending private school
within their geographic boundaries as opposed to students residing there. This revision
may appear to promote efficiency,55 and obviously facilitates the delivery of services on
the site of the private school.56 But it may also have unintended consequences because
the overall amount of federal special education money any district receives is based
primarily on the total count of private and public school students being educated in the

50

§ 1412(a)(10)(A)(i)(IV).
§ 1412(a)(10)(A)(i)(V). A state educational agency is the state department of education, state board of
education, or equivalent state-level entity that receives federal special education money and then passes it
on to local school districts after keeping back a fraction to defray state administrative expenditures.
52
§ 1412(a)(10)(A)(ii)(II)-(III).
53
§ 1412(a)(10)(A)(ii)(IV).
54
§ 1412(a)(10)(A)(ii)(V).
55
There would appear to be efficiency advantages in having the entity closest to the private school serve
the children who spend the bulk of their school day there.
56
A single public school district that is responsible for all of the students needing special education at a
given private school would seem more likely to furnish those services on site than would many school
districts that are each obligated to serve only a few students at any given private school. See generally
infra text accompanying notes 152-169 (discussing on-site services).
51
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district, not the count of students with disabilities.57 To explain: Consider the situation
of a school district with a disproportionate number of private schools that accept and
educate students with disabilities.58 That district will be forced to share the federal
special education funds it receives with the large number of students who have
disabilities who are drawn to the private schools located there.

In contrast, the

neighboring district that is home to many private schools that ruthlessly exclude students
with disabilities will see its federal special education allotment rise with the total student
count but will have to share the resources with few or no private school students who
need special education services. The first district starves while the second feasts.
Moreover, according to non-regulatory guidance from the Department of Education,
children from out of state must be treated in the same fashion as private school children
from neighboring school districts in state.59 This requirement appears to further
exacerbate inequalities of burdens among school districts that are home to private schools
that accept high special-needs as opposed to low special-needs students.

57

The allocation of funds depends on a variety of factors in addition to student count, but the total of
children enrolled in public and private elementary and secondary schools in the district’s jurisdiction is
paramount. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1411(f)(2)(A)-(B) (West 2006).
58
Unless they receive federal funds, elementary and secondary schools run by religious entities are free
from federal law obligations not to discriminate against students with disabilities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12187
(2000) (exempting religious organizations or entities controlled by religious organizations). Non-religious
private schools are bound by the public accommodations provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”), and all schools that receive federal funds are bound by section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, but under both those laws, the school need not serve students who need modifications that would
fundamentally alter the nature of the educational services or result in an undue burden. See 42 U.S.C. §
12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii) (2000) (defining discrimination under title III public accommodations provisions of
ADA); Southeastern Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979) (interpreting section 504); St. Johnsbury
Acad. v. D.H., 240 F.3d 163, 174 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding student with disabilities not qualified for
mainstream academic classes at private school); see also Taylor, supra note 22, at 11 (finding “minimal
court involvement in directing private schools to comply with ADA,” but noting voluntary activities on the
part of some private schools and possibility of stronger ADA enforcement). A prominent author has urged
that stronger duties of non-discrimination be imposed on private schools. Lynn M. Daggett, The Case for
State Protection of Private School Students from Discrimination, CHILD. LEGAL RTS J. (forthcoming).
59
U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Questions and Answers on Serving Children with Disabilities Placed by Their
Parents at Private Schools, at E-2 (2006), at http://www.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/faq-parent-placed.doc
(visited Mar. 21, 2006).
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The reallocation of responsibilities for private school children from the district of
residence to that of attendance relates not just to funding, but also to the duty to identify,
locate, and evaluate the children for eligibility for IDEA services. IDEA provides
extensive rights to children to be evaluated to determine eligibility and the need for
particular special education services.60 Among the rights is that to an independent
educational evaluation by a qualified individual not attached to the public school system
when the parent disagrees with the school district’s evaluation and the school district
does not challenge the disagreement in a due process hearing.61 This independent
evaluation must be provided at public expense.62
IDEA entitles private school children to evaluation by the public school district,
and the activities undertaken to comply with that requirement must be comparable to
activities undertaken for public school children.63 This provision would suggest that the
full set of evaluation rights, including that to independent evaluation at public expense,
applies to all private school children being educated in the district. Interpreting Michigan
law, a court found that a private school child was entitled to an independent educational
evaluation at public expense (or that the school district had to invoke due process hearing
rights to avoid providing the evaluation), reasoning that the state law applied to “every
handicapped person.”64 Although there are no decisions construing IDEA on the private
school student-independent educational evaluation issue, the federal law obligations

60

See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(a)-(c) (West 2006) (listing many requirements for evaluations). A court has
recently affirmed that parents may avoid evaluation of their child if they so choose by withholding consent
and withdrawing the child from the public school system. Fitzgerald v. Camdenton R-III Sch. Dist., 439
F.3d 773 (8th Cir. 2006).
61
34 C.F.R. § 300.502 (2005).
62
34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b) (2005).
63
34 C.F.R. § 300.451 (2005).
64
Mich. Dep’t of Educ. v. Grosse Pointe Pub. Schs., 701 N.W.2d 195 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005), vacated as
moot, Nos. 129249, 129250, 2006 WL 1097490 (Mich. Apr 26, 2006).
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appear to be the same. A guidance circular issued by the United States Department of
Education discusses independent educational evaluations as a right of private school
children and notes that “parents should file the request for an IEE [independent
educational evaluation] with the LEA [local educational agency, typically the school
district] that conducted the evaluation with which the parents disagree.”65
Additional issues related to evaluation may arise not because of any change in the
private school students provision of the Improvement Act, but because of the revisions in
the evaluation procedures themselves. The Improvement Act bars states from forcing
school districts to use discrepancies between ability and performance to determine IDEA
eligibility on the basis of learning disabilities.66 The leading non-discrepancy-based
methodology is Response to Intervention (RTI), a model that contemplates providing
high quality, research-based instruction in general education, and determining that the
child has a learning disability only if the intervention proves ineffective over time or
otherwise reveals some pattern indicative of learning disability.67 Since the public school
district does not control the bulk of the private school child’s instructional day, how it can
employ this model, much less use it to obtain meaningful results under time constraints
identical to those that would apply if the student were in the public school, is a mystery.
To its credit, the Department of Education attempted to address this problem in
the preamble to the final version of the Improvement Act regulations. Its response,
however, was simply to note that states must develop their own criteria to determine
whether a child has a learning disability, and that in doing so, “States may wish to
65

U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Questions and Answers on Serving Children with Disabilities Placed by Their
Parents at Private Schools, at F-3 (2006), at http://www.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/faq-parent-placed.doc
(visited Mar. 21, 2006).
66
See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(b)(6)(A) (West 2006).
67
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 70 Fed. Reg. 35782, 35802 (June 21, 2005).
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consider how the criteria will be implemented with a child for whom systematic data on
the child’s response to appropriate instruction is not available.”68 The Department
asserted that many private schools would collect the needed data, but allowed that the
district making the eligibility determination may need to use other, unspecified,
information.69
B.

Consultation Requirements and Service Delivery
School districts must consult with representatives of private schools regarding the

child-find process and the determination of proportionate amount.70 The consultation has
to include how the district will consult with the private school representatives and parent
representatives about provision of services;71 it must include how, where, and by whom
services will be provided, including types of services and apportionment if funds are
scarce.72 The consultation must also include how the district will provide reasons for not
providing direct or contract services, if the private school representatives disagree with
the agency about the provision of services or type of services.73 The district is to obtain a
written affirmation from the private school representatives that the consultation has
occurred; if the representatives do not oblige, the district must provide documentation of
its consultation efforts to the state educational agency.74

68

Final Rules, 71 Fed. Reg. 46540, 46648 (Aug. 14, 2006).
Id.
70
§ 1412(a)(10)(A)(iii).
71
§ 1412(a)(10)(A)(iii)(III). The requirement of consultation about consultation may strike some as
consultation gone haywire, like the “pre-meeting meeting” so common in academic and business settings.
72
§ 1412(a)(10)(A)(iii) (IV).
73
§ 1412(a)(10)(A)(iii)(V).
74
§ 1412(a)(10)(A)(iv).

69
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These consultation provisions mirror those for other federally funded education
programs.75 They suggest confidence that the process of discussing mutual goals and
concerns will lead to consensus about means. Reports about the success of the existing
consultation processes are sparse, so it is difficult to assess the virtue of what the new law
has codified. In any instance, the congressional incorporation of the special education
provision into the statute, copying what had previously existed only in the regulations,
indicates some distrust of what the Department of Education might do if the control of
the executive branch shifts at some time in the future.76
Private school officials may complain to the state about failure to consult, and
may take their complaint to the United States Secretary of Education if dissatisfied with
the results.77 The United States Department of Education has no direct control over the
local school district, but possibly could cut off federal funding if a school district
persisted in noncompliance. In addition, there is a mechanism by which the Department
of Education may bypass a state or local education agency and deliver that entity’s
portion of federal funding for private schoolers directly to other providers of services to
those students.78 This “By-Pass” provision applies if a state law enacted before the 1983
amendments to the federal special education statute prohibits the state from providing

75

See Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 20 U.S.C.A. § 7881(c) (West 2006) (requiring public
school districts to consult with private school representatives with respect to administration of federal
educational programs); see also Office of Non-Public Education, Office of Innovation and Improvement,
U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Equitable Services to Eligible Private School Students, Teachers, and Other
Educational Personnel 5-9 (2005) (giving non-regulatory guidance on consultation requirements for various
federal educational programs).
76
See Weber, supra note 9, at 13-14 (describing apparent congressional distrust of Department of
Education’s future regulatory activity, evidenced by placing matters previously covered by regulation in
statutory language).
77
20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(10)(A)(v) (West 2006).
78
See § 1412(f).
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equitable participation in special education programs for children in private schools.79 It
also applies if the Secretary of Education determines that a state education agency or
local school district “has substantially failed or is unwilling to provide for such equitable
participation.”80 Under the bypass, the federal government withholds funds from the
state or local education agency to compensate for the cost of services delivered directly
by the contractor of the federal government.81 Various procedural safeguards exist to
prevent the action from being taken in error.82 The bypass option appears designed to
induce reluctant school districts to comply with IDEA’s private school student provisions
rather than lose control over the relevant federal funding, but it may be a paper tiger.
Conceivably, the United States Department of Education has threatened to use the
provision to force states or school districts to give special education services to private
school children, but if a special education bypass has actually been implemented, it is a
well kept secret.83
Under the Improvement Act, as under previous law, services may be provided
directly by school district or other public personnel, or by contract with other workers;
the services are to be secular, neutral, and nonideological.84 Funds and property are to
remain in control of the local or state educational agency.85 The regulations promulgated
to implement the Improvement Act state that districts must conduct the child count on
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§ 1412(f)(1).
Id.
81
§ 1412(f)(2)(B).
82
§ 1412(f)(3).
83
Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, which funds remedial education services for
low-income children, also has a by-pass provision, and by-passes were granted for title I services in the
1970s in Missouri and Virginia. Washington’s Catholic Schools Seek Title I By-Pass, Thompson Title I
Online, at http://www.thompson.com/libraries/titleionline/news_desk/tio050626.html (last visited Mar. 22,
2006).
84
20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(10)(A)(vi) (West 2006).
85
§ 1412(a)(10)(A)(vii).
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any date between October 1 and December 1 of each year.86 Like the old regulations, the
new call for transportation from the child’s school or home to a site other than the private
school and from the service site to the home or private school, but not from home to
private school.87 Like the old regulations, the new forbid organizing classes separately
by private school or religion if the classes are at the same site and the classes include
students enrolled in private school and public school.88 Provisions governing use of
public and private personnel are retained,89 as are those forbidding benefit to the private
school,90 and requiring the public school system to retain ownership of property,
equipment and supplies.91
Like old regulations, the new regulations establish that the services provided to
private school children “must be provided by personnel meeting the same standards as
personnel providing services in the public schools.”92 The regulation makes clear,
however, that private elementary and secondary school teachers contracted to provide
services do not have to meet the “highly qualified” standards otherwise required of
teachers under IDEA and No Child Left Behind.93
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34 C.F.R. § 300.133(c)(ii) (2006).
34 C.F.R. § 300.139(b) (2006); see 34 C.F.R. § 456(b)(1) (2004).
88
34 C.F.R. § 300.143 (2006); see 34 C.F.R. § 458 (2004).
89
34 C.F.R. § 300.142 (2006); see 34 C.F.R. §§ 460-461 (2004).
90
34 C.F.R. § 300.141 (2006); see 34 C.F.R. § 459 (2004).
91
34 C.F.R. § 300.144 (2006); see 34 C.F.R. § 462 (2004).
92
34 C.F.R. § 300.138(a)(i) (2006); see 34 C.F.R. § 455(a)(1) (2004). Teachers from the private school
may be hired, but only in their off hours. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Questions and Answers on Serving Children
with Disabilities Placed by Their Parents at Private Schools, at C-7 (2006), at
http://www.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/faq-parent-placed.doc (visited Mar. 21, 2006). The school district is
forbidden from paying the private school for the services of the private school teachers. Id. at C-12.
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Id.; see also Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 70 Fed. Reg. 35782, 35784 (June 21, 2005) (discussing
proposed regulation). The greater controversy has been whether teachers in private schools must meet the
qualification requirements when the special education students are placed in the private schools by school
districts because no public school placement meets the students’ needs. See Final Rules, 71 Fed. Reg.
46540, 46598 (Aug. 14, 2006) (defending regulation not requiring private school teachers to meet
qualifications).
87
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III. Individual Entitlements to Services and Related Issues
The very existence of statutory provisions concerning allocation of special
education resources among private school children and consultation about the allocation
suggests that no given private school child is assured of a full measure of the services.
Nobody talks of rationing when everyone is assured access to whatever amount of a good
or service is needed. Under the Improvement Act, as under previous law, there is no
federal statutory assurance or guarantee to private school children of needed, or even of
any, special education services. State law provides an entitlement in some jurisdictions,
but the relevant states amount to just a handful. Some individual treatment is established
under federal law for children who receive services, but federal law does not even
guarantee individually enforceable rights to administrative review. Moreover, though
parents may expect school districts to allocate services so that they are provided in the
private schools their children attend, there is no federal entitlement to services delivered
on site. State law may be more liberal, but such liberality is rare. Finally, under federal
law home-schooled children are not even guaranteed consideration for allocation of
special education resources.
A.

Individual Entitlements to Services
Before the 1997 revisions IDEA might have been read to confer an individual

right to free, appropriate public education for children with disabilities enrolled in private
schools,94 but the changes made that year appeared to eliminate any such possibility, and
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As noted, the statutory language requiring equitable participation was vague. See supra text
accompanying notes 37-42. Nevertheless, the words in the original statutory title “All Handicapped
Children” suggested plenary and individual rights to services. See Tribble v. Montgomery County Bd. of
Educ., 798 F. Supp. 668, 670-71 (M.D. Ala. 1992) (finding entitlement to special education for child in
private school), op. vacated and appeal dismissed, No. Civ. A. 91-H-1536-N (July 14, 1993).
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the interpretation adopted by the federal regulations flatly ruled out any individual right.95
Interpreting the 1997 federal law, the Seventh Circuit declared:
[T]he [1997] Amendments unambiguously show that participating states
and localities have no obligation to spend their money to ensure that
disabled children who have chosen to enroll in private schools will receive
publicly-funded education generally “comparable” to those provided to
public-school children.96
The Seventh Circuit’s position is unassailable. The passage from the 1997 IDEA
amendments quoted in Section I of this Article establishes that parents have no right
under the law to tuition payments for private school if they placed their children there for
any reasons other than that the school district was failing to offer appropriate education.97
This language survives in the Improvement Act.98 Considered in light of the
statutory provision that demands proportionate allocation of funding but fails to call for a
free, appropriate public education for private school children, the language permits no
other conclusion but that there is no individual federal law right to services that any
specific child can assert. Both the new federal regulations under the Improvement Act
and the regulations they replace state the proposition directly: “No parentally placed
private school child with a disability has an individual right to receive some or all of the
95

34 C.F.R. § 300.454(a)(1) (2004) (“No private school child with a disability has an individual right to
receive some or all of the special education and related services that the child would receive if enrolled in a
public school.”); see also § 300.455(a)(2) (“Private school children with disabilities may receive a different
amount of services than children in public schools.”), § 300.455(a)(3) (“No private school child with a
disability is entitled to any service or to any amount of a service the child would receive if enrolled in a
public school.”).
96
K.R. v. Anderson Cmty. Sch. Corp., 125 F.3d 1017, 1019 (7th Cir. 1997).
97
See supra text accompanying note 42 (quoting 20 U.S.C.A. §1412(a)(10)(C)(i) (West 1998) (“[T]his
part does not require a local educational agency to pay for the cost of education, including special
education and related services, of a child with a disability at a private school or facility if that agency made
a free appropriate public education available to the child and the parents elected to place the child in such
private school or facility.”).
98
20 U.S.C.A. §1412(a)(10)(C)(i) (West 2006).
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special education and related services that the child would receive if enrolled in a public
school.”99
State law, however, may create an entitlement to services that the federal law does
not provide.100 For example, in John T. v. Marion Independent School District,101 a
federal appeals court concluded that Iowa law conferred on a private school student an
individual right to services, even though the court decided that the 1997 version of IDEA
did not.102 The opinion relied on an Iowa statute requiring that school districts “shall
make public school services, which shall include special education programs and services
. . . , available to children attending nonpublic schools in the same manner and to the
same extent that they are provided to public school students.”103 The child in the case
had cerebral palsy, which severely restricted his physical mobility and communication
abilities, and so he needed a full-time aide while in school. He attended a private,
religious school.104 The school district announced that it would provide the aide services
only if he were enrolled in public school, relying on a provision of the state statute that
said that assistance with physical and communication needs “may” be provided on
99

34 C.F.R. § 300.137(a) (2006); see 34 C.F.R. § 300.454(a)(1) (2004). The new version adds the
language “privately placed” and thus reinforces the point that the provision applies to children placed in
private educational institutions as a result of parental, rather than school district, decisions.
100
Under the IDEA framework, states are always free to create rights to special education services that go
beyond what the federal law provides. See Town of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 736 F.2d 773, 789 (1st
Cir. 1984) (finding elevated state law standard for appropriate education enforceable under federal law
provision defining appropriate services as those meeting standards of state educational agency), aff’d sub
nom. Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359 (1985). Even if the state law provisions
relevant here were not to be considered enforceable under IDEA itself, federal courts would have pendent
jurisdiction to enforce state law if a colorable federal law claim were to exist against the school district
based on the same common nucleus of operative fact. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2000). Local school
districts are, in general, not considered arms of the state government protected by Eleventh Amendment
immunity. See Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280-81 (1977); cf.
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (finding state immune from suit in federal
court for violation of state law under Eleventh Amendment principles). Alternatively, the state courts could
enforce the state laws against the school districts.
101
173 F.3d 684 (8th Cir. 1999).
102
Id. at 691.
103
Id. at 689 (citing IOWA CODE § 256.12(2)).
104
Id. at 687.
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nonpublic school premises. The court held that reading the “may” language of the statute
to undermine the basic obligation to provide services was nonsensical and found a
violation of the state law.105 The Iowa legislature subsequently amended the law in a
manner consistent with the court of appeals’ reading of the original provision.106 The
state law thus confers an individual entitlement to services, and in fact even confers an
effective entitlement to services on the site of the private school when the child’s
disabilities necessitate the presence of an aide during the school day.
The law in Kansas establishes a similar individual entitlement to services. In
Fowler v. Unified School District No. 259,107 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
considered the case of a profoundly deaf child with superior intellectual capacities whose
parents voluntarily placed him in a private, nonreligious school where they felt his
intellectual development would be stimulated. The school district had previously
provided him sign language interpretation services in a public school class that clustered
students with hearing impairments.108 The parents requested the school district to
provide a sign-language interpreter on the site of the private school, but the district
refused.109 After administrative proceedings and a district court ruling, the court of
appeals decided that then-applicable (pre-1997) federal and state law required the district
to fund the child’s interpretation services in an amount up to the average cost to the
school district to provide the same services in a public school.110 The Supreme Court

105

Id. at 688-89.
2006 Iowa Legis. Serv. S.F. 2272 (West).
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128 F.3d 1431 (10th Cir. 1997).
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Id. at 1433.
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vacated that decision and remanded for reconsideration in light of the 1997 changes to
IDEA.111
On remand, the Tenth Circuit held open the question whether there is any
individual entitlement to the services under federal law for the period after the effective
date of the 1997 amendment to IDEA.112 It ruled, however, that Kansas law, enforceable
in federal court under IDEA, does provide an individual entitlement to services, at a cost
no greater than the average cost of providing the services in the public schools.113 The
court relied on this statutory language:
Any school which provides auxiliary school services to pupils attending its
schools shall provide on an equal basis the same auxiliary school services
to every pupil, whose parent or guardian makes a request therefor, residing
in the school district and attending a private, nonprofit elementary or
secondary school whether such school is located within or outside the
school district.114
The statute further provided for delivering the services on the site of the private school if
it was located in the district and services could practically be delivered there, and thus the
court found that under the facts of the case the child had a state law entitlement to on-site
services.115 The “equal basis” language of law led the court to limit the cost of the
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Fowler v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 259, 521 U.S. 1115 (1997).
Fowler, 128 F.3d at 1438 n.6 (“We express no opinion whether a child whose proportionate share of the
Federal funds in fact turns out to be zero, or a sum substantially lower than other students, could argue that
his or her rights under IDEA or, perhaps, the constitution, are violated.”).
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Id. at 1439.
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interpreter services to “no greater than the average cost of providing hearing-impaired
students with interpretive services at public schools.”116
In 1999, Kansas amended its statute. The language now reads:
Every school district shall provide special education services for
exceptional children who reside in the school district and attend a private,
nonprofit elementary or secondary school, whether such school is located
within or outside the school district, upon the request of the parent or
guardian of any such child for the provision of such services.117
Like the pre-2004 IDEA provisions on private school students, the enactment keys the
provision of services to the district of residency, rather than that in which the child
attends private school, creating the prospect of districts having to expend non-federal
funds for resident children who attend private school outside of school boundaries while
expending federal funds for both resident and non-resident children who attend school
within the boundaries. Perhaps the obligations of the various districts towards the
relevant children will even out in the end. The requirement for on-site services found in
the earlier law has been diluted. Now the school district is to determine the site for
provision of the services, “in consultation with the parent or guardian.”118 The statutory
terms incorporate the average-cost holding of Fowler for services delivered on site:
If services are provided for in the private . . . school, amounts expended
for the provision of such services shall not be required to exceed the
average cost to the school district for the provision of the same services in
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the public schools of the school district for children within the same
category of exceptionality.119
Pennsylvania is an additional jurisdiction in which courts have interpreted state
law to create an individual entitlement to special education services for private school
children. A federal district court ruled in 2000 that a child with mental retardation who
attended a private, religious school had a personal entitlement under state law to services
such as a speech therapy, occupational therapy, itinerant teaching services for nonreligious courses, and teacher’s aide services.120 The court relied on a statute providing
that the relevant public educational agency had the duty “to maintain, administer,
supervise and operate such additional classes or schools as are necessary or to otherwise
provide for the proper education and training for all exceptional children who are not
enrolled in classes or schools maintained and operated by school districts or who are not
otherwise provided for.”121 The court limited the reach of the holding, however, by
stressing that it was impossible in this particular case for the child “to receive a proper
education” in the public school.122 The court found as fact that the child reacted
negatively to separation from his two brothers, who attended the private school, and
would cry and resist getting on the bus to attend the public school.123 At the private
school, the child’s brothers and friends would help and support him, but he lacked peer
support and acceptance at the public school.124 The court did not intimate what the result
might be if the reason for the private school placement were purely the religious or other
119
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preferences of the parents, and the child could receive a proper education in the public
schools if the parents preferred that option.
Veschi v. Northwestern Lehigh School District125 addressed that open issue. In
Veschi, the Commonwealth court ruled that a school district had to make speech and
language therapy available to Vincent Veschi, a child with disabilities who attended a
parochial school.126 The court characterized the district’s decision to refuse to deliver the
services to a private school child as conditioning provision of the services on enrollment
in the district’s public schools.127 It said that the “crux of the Veschis’ argument, and one
with which we agree, is that they have a constitutionally protected right to decide where
Vincent goes to school under Pierce v. Society of Sisters and Wisconsin v. Yoder.”128 The
court did not develop that argument, however.129 Instead it gave most of its attention to
Pennsylvania law.130 The court noted one provision that states: “No pupil shall be
refused admission to the courses in [special] schools or departments, by reason of the fact
that his elementary or academic education is being or has been received in a school other
than a public school.”131 The court thought this language applicable because special
departments within school districts provide speech and language therapy services.132 The
court also cited other provisions, declaring that nothing in law either barred dual
enrollment of a child in public and private school, or gave the school district direct
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authority to force a child to enroll in public school in order to take advantage of public
school special education classes.133 To the contrary, a regulatory provision required that
students who attend nonpublic schools be afforded equal opportunity to participate in
special education services and programs.134
A Pennsylvania court recently extended Veschi to require a public school to
provide occupational therapy services to a private school child deemed eligible under
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, but not IDEA. In Lower Merion School District v.
Doe,135 a panel of the Commonwealth Court considered the case of a six-year-old child
who had been found not to meet the definition of a child with disabilities under IDEA,
but had been found eligible for occupational therapy services under section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973. As noted above, section 504 entitles some children to
adaptations or supplemental services under the school district’s obligation not to
discriminate, even though the children do not need special education to learn or otherwise
are ineligible for services under IDEA.136 The parent enrolled the child in a private
kindergarten program, dually enrolled him in the public school district, and requested that
occupational therapy be provided at a public school.137 In affirming an administrative
decision requiring the district to provide the services, the court relied on a federal
regulation promulgated under section 504 that obligates recipients of federal money who
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operate public elementary or secondary education programs to furnish a free, appropriate
public education to all children who meet the eligibility standards of section 504.138 The
court also rested its decision on provisions of Pennsylvania law implementing that
obligation.139 It placed weight on the general interpretation of state law in Veschi, which,
as noted, required that speech and language therapy be provided to a child enrolled in a
private school when the child was disabled so as to be eligible under IDEA.140 The
dissenting judge complained that Veschi relied on a Pennsylvania regulatory provision
that had since been repealed,141 and further argued that section 504’s basic obligation to
provide accommodations to children receiving services from public schools did not
constitute a right to services when the child is not attending courses or classes in the
public schools.142
Lower Merion’s discovery of an individual entitlement to services for a private
school child eligible solely under section 504 may well arouse criticism. Simply looking
at the federal law issues in the case, it seems strange that private school children who are
covered by section 504 but not IDEA would have an individual right to services from the
public school system, when children covered by IDEA do not. Section 504 is at bottom a
nondiscrimination statute,143 and unlike IDEA does not create a funding stream or set out
specific obligations beyond the general duty not to discriminate on the basis of disability.
For children in public schools, section 504 extends to all children with disabilities who
138
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meet its coverage definition144 the entitlement to reasonable accommodations:
modifications of rules, additional services, and the like so that children with disabilities
may be educated on an equal plane with others whether the children with disabilities are
IDEA-eligible or not. But if children in private schools who are IDEA-eligible have no
entitlement to special education services under that law, it is hard to find a basis in
section 504 for conferring an entitlement to children who have disabling conditions that
do not trigger IDEA eligibility. Of course, it could be that section 504 confers the
individual entitlement to publicly funded special education services on all children with
disabling conditions, irrespective of the children’s eligibility under IDEA. But the
general provisions of section 504 contain no language conferring such a right, and the
federal regulatory provision relied on by the Lower Merion court may easily be
interpreted as applying only to children actually attending the district’s schools.
Nevertheless, Lower Merion stands as the most recent example of finding individual
entitlements to services in state law. Although the dissent took the majority to task for
relying on a case that followed a state regulatory provision that had since been repealed,
the majority cited ample support for its position from other sources.
Statutes and regulatory provisions in other states remain undeveloped as potential
sources of individual rights to services. In addition, there is always the prospect of state
legislative change. Advocates of greater public support for special education services for
private school children might be well advised to look to their state legislatures rather than
Congress, in light of the congressional decision to stay with the outlines of the 1997
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legislation when revising the federal statute in 2004. The successful implementation of
entitlements for private school students where the state law entitlements exist may furnish
evidence to respond to the criticism that providing a federal entitlement is unworkable or
unduly expensive.
Even in the absence of an individual, enforceable right to services, the federal
special education law makes one nod to individual treatment in delivery of services to
children with disabilities in private schools. Regulations promulgated under the 1997
version of IDEA established that districts had to create service plans for all the private
school children they serve; the plans had to describe the specific special education and
related services that the school district will furnish to the individual student.145 The
Improvement Act regulations retain this provision: Each private school child served
must have a services plan.146 The regulations further state that a services plan “means a
written statement that describes the special education and related services” that the school
district “will provide to a parentally-placed child with a disability enrolled in a private
school who has been designated to receive services, including the location of the services
and any transportation necessary . . . .”147 The process for development of the services
plan must include the involvement of a representative of the private school.148
Otherwise, the process for development and the content of the final product resemble to
some degree the process and content of individualized education programs.149
Whatever procedural regularity the services plan requirement entails nevertheless
stops short of the right to appeal school district decisions to refuse services to an
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individual child. The Improvement Act regulations retain the previous provision
forbidding disgruntled parents from using the IDEA due process hearing procedure for
any complaints except those having to do with failure by the school district to properly
identify, locate, or evaluate the private school student.150 For all other complaints, the
parents are expected to make use of the state investigation and resolution process, which
lacks the rights of notice, hearing, and judicial review furnished by the ordinary special
education administrative procedure.151
B.

On-Site Services
The House Committee Report on the bill that became the Improvement Act states

a preference for services provided on the site of the private school:
The Committee wishes to make clear that local educational agencies
should provide direct services for parentally placed private school students
with disabilities (as for most students) on site at their school, unless there
is a compelling rationale for such off-site services. Such intent indicates
the preference that providing services on site at the private school is more
appropriate for the student and less costly in terms of transportation and
liability.152
This strong preference is repeated in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for the
Improvement Act regulations,153 but does not appear in the proposed or final regulations
themselves, just as it missed being included in the language of the statute. Given the
current questioning by many courts of the use of legislative history in the interpretation of
150
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statutes,154 the preference could easily become a dead letter. The preamble to the final
regulations repeats that preference for on-site services is the Department of Education’s
position, but goes on to state that the congressional language subjecting the term “may be
provided to the children on the premises of private, including religious, schools” to the
condition “to the extent consistent with law” permits state constitutions or other law to
override any preference for on-site services.155 What the Department of Education
appears to have in mind is a state whose constitution imposes greater restrictions on
religious establishment than the Supreme Court currently finds to have been imposed by
the United States Constitution.156 But the Department of Education’s statement would
seem to apply as well when a state has any statute or rule, enacted for whatever reason,
that forbids on-site services or permits local school districts to refuse to provide them.
The omission of any guarantee of on-site services provides yet another example of
how what might have been a more radical change in the law ended up reinforcing
continuity with the status quo. Even before the passage of the 1997 IDEA amendments,
the leading case Goodall v. Stafford County School Board157 established that a school
district may choose to offer services only at public school locations, and may refuse to
offer services in private school buildings. Part of Goodall’s reasoning was that on-site
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See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in
judgment) (declaring legislative history to be illegitimate as basis for statutory interpretation). See
generally Michael H. Koby, The Supreme Court's Declining Reliance on Legislative History: The Impact of
Justice Scalia's Critique 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 361 (1999) (finding sharp decline in Supreme Court
reliance on legislative history). The debate on the propriety of reliance on legislative history is beyond the
scope of this Article.
155
Final Rules, 71 Fed. Reg. 46540, 46596 (Aug. 14, 2006).
156
For example, a state may interpret its own constitutional provision forbidding establishment of religion
more in line with the view of the First Amendment taken by the Supreme Court before the 1990s. See
generally infra text accompanying notes 158-159 (noting change in Supreme Court interpretation to permit
publicly supported remedial education services on sites of religious schools).
157
930 F.2d 363 (4th Cir. 1991). Goodall drew criticism almost immediately. See Eileen N. Wagner,
Public Responsibility for Special Education and Related Services in Private Schools, 20 J.L. & EDUC. 43
(1991) (contending services in religious schools do not cause excessive entanglement).

34

services at religious school excessively entangle church and state, a position that does not
survive Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District158and Agostini v. Felton,159 Supreme
Court cases that upheld, respectively, the placement of a public-school funded sign
language interpreter at a religious school and the provision of remedial services under
title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act at a religious school. The
Supreme Court decisions did not affect the other bases for the Goodall court’s reasoning,
however, which included the basic point that nothing in the statute commands services on
the location of a private school if the district prefers to provide them elsewhere.160 After
the 1997 law clarified that no individual entitlement to services existed at all, numerous
courts rejected demands for on-site services, relying on the new statute and the
Department of Education regulation interpreting it.161
Some cases uphold the principle that the services need not be provided on site
even when the denial of on-site services appears scarcely rational. Bristol Warren
Regional School Committee v. Rhode Island Department of Education162 refused a
demand for services on the site of a parochial school, upholding a policy under which the
school district provided on-site services only when the private school was within walking
distance of a public school.163 From the students’ perspective, that would be when onsite services would be needed least. Perhaps the rationale for the policy was the
convenience of the teachers or other personnel based at the public facility, who might
158
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otherwise need to be transported to the private school location.164 Alternatively, the
conduct of the district may have been purely capricious.
Nevertheless, state law may create an entitlement to services provided on site. In
Bay Shore Union Free School District v. T.,165 Judge Jack Weinstein concluded
“dubitante” that New York law confers upon a child who is eligible for special education
an individual entitlement to services at the child’s private school.166 Ruling that a child
with attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder was entitled to the services of a one-on-one
aide for three hours a day at his private school, the court noted that denial of the services
would burden a religious choice of the parents to send the child to a sectarian school; a
construction of New York statutes that provided for the services would avoid a potential
conflict with the right of free exercise of religion.167 The court also emphasized that
under the facts of the particular case, a hearing officer had found that a one-on-one aide
could be provided only in the private school, and that for this child, the aide was
necessary if the child were to receive free, appropriate public education.168 Though the
court pointed out that the law in some other states differs from that of New York,169 one
may expect advocates of private school services to undertake litigation to have courts
enforce state laws that look like New York’s in a manner similar to the construction in
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Bay Shore, and one may expect advocates in other states to work for changes in their
state legislation to imitate New York’s.
C.

Home Schooling
Some home-schoolers have an even more basic complaint than that of the families

whose children are inadequately served or served away from their private schools
because of allocation decisions made by local school districts. In some states, home
schooling is not considered private school, and so home-schooled children are not even
eligible for being considered for IDEA funded services. The Improvement Act is silent
regarding whether home-schooled children qualify as children in private schools and thus
may participate in the fight for the pool of services that a school district provides private
school children with disabilities. The leading decision on the topic holds that eligibility
under IDEA of home-schooled children for publicly funded services for private school
children depends on state law. In Hooks v. Clark County School District,170 the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a state has the choice whether home schooling will
qualify as private schooling under IDEA, and it held that for the relevant time period,
Nevada had decided not to include home instruction in with private schools.171 The court
relied on a United States Department of Education interpretation of the IDEA,172 and
further stated that Congress endorsed that interpretation by enacting definitions of
“elementary school” and “secondary school” that delegate to the states the determination
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of which educational institutions qualify and which do not.173 The court thus affirmed
the denial of reimbursement for speech therapy services obtained by parents of a child
with a disability who was being educated at home.174
Hooks received a chilly reaction from commentators. They pointed out that the
Department of Education’s interpretation is by no means the only way to read the
statute,175 and that the approach of the Department and the court will cause disuniformity
among the states.176 Plainly, the result will cause some children with disabilities not to
receive publicly funded school services, contrary to the general goal of providing a free,
appropriate public education to all children with disabilities.177 These criticisms of the
decision have some power, but cannot overcome a longstanding interpretation by the
agency Congress chose to enforce the statute,178 particularly when Congress
comprehensively amended provisions relating to private schools in 1997, and then after
Hooks in 2004, without making any change in the definition of what is a private school or
otherwise doing anything to explicitly cover home schoolers.
Questions about access to facilities may yield a different answer than those about
the right to services. One district court case initially held that equal protection, federal
173
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statutory disability discrimination, and state law claims may lie against a school district
for excluding a home-schooled child with a disability from a playground during the hours
public school children used it.179 Ultimately, however, the court dismissed the federal
claims for failure to exhaust IDEA administrative remedies and remanded the remaining
claims to state court.180 The child’s parents pursued to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court
the question whether the school could continue to suspend the child from use of the
playground in the absence of a functional behavioral assessment of the child, when he
had reportedly manifested aggression towards students and adult supervisors.181 The
court ruled that state law permitted the child’s exclusion.182
IV. Religious Free Exercise and Parental Autonomy Issues
As noted above, in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District183 the Supreme
Court ruled that a school district’s funding of a public-school funded sign language
interpreter at a religious school did not violate the First Amendment’s establishment
clause.184 The controversy since that case has been whether, if a public school system
opts not to provide services to children who attend religious or other private schools, it
violates the free exercise clause, due process clause, or some other constitutional
provision. Depending on what policies the district adopts, its conduct might be
challenged as imposition of an unconstitutional condition or as constitutionally
impermissible viewpoint discrimination.
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A.

Unconstitutional Conditions
Under IDEA, school districts can give lesser amounts of services to children in

private schools, including religious schools, than they give to the same children if the
children were attending public school. For some of the children, lesser services likely
means no services at all. Not surprisingly, parents will view this as the school district’s
conditioning the provision of needed services on the parents’ decision to withdraw their
children from private school and enroll them in public school. The decision to obtain
public schooling will run against the parents’ preferences regarding their children’s
education and may cause the parents to violate what they perceive as their religious
duties. Is this the imposition of an unconstitutional condition?
In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Supreme Court ruled that a statute forcing
parents to send their children to public schools or face criminal penalties “unreasonably
interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education
of children under their control.”185 The Supreme Court’s decision drew support from
Meyer v. Nebraska,186 which overturned a the conviction of a teacher for instructing
children below the eighth grade in a language other than English. That ban violated the
Fourteenth Amendment rights of parents to provide for instruction of their children and
the right of the teacher to practice his calling.187 Both holdings survived the 1930s
revolution in Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process doctrine exemplified by
Nebbia v. New York188 and West Coast Hotel v. Parrish,189 cases establishing the
principle that general economic and social laws are to be evaluated under a rational basis
185
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test, and thus that the Court will find no due process violation if the enactment bears a
minimal relation to any legitimate governmental end.190
Although neither Pierce nor Meyer relied on the guarantee of free exercise of
religion, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court cited both (and relied significantly on Pierce)
when it upheld the free exercise claim of Amish parents against a state law requiring all
children to attend school until age sixteen when compliance conflicted with Amish
religious tenets.191 In Yoder, the Court reasoned that just as Pierce had subordinated the
state’s interest in establishing and controlling basic education to “the interest of parents in
directing the rearing of their off-spring, including their education in church-operated
schools,” so too the governmental interest in one or two additional years of education had
to yield to the religious free exercise interest of the Amish.192 The Court stressed that
enforcing the law against the religionists would gravely endanger if not destroy their
religion, and that the interests of the state were satisfied in part by the informal training
the children received in their communities and the longstanding self-sufficiency of Amish
people in the communities.193 Subsequent to Yoder, the Supreme Court in a series of
cases culminating in the 1990 decision Employment Division v. Smith limited the reach of
the free exercise guarantee, and affirmed that “the right of free exercise does not relieve
an individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general
applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his
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religion prescribes (or proscribes).’”194 But Smith did not overrule Yoder. It
distinguished it as a “hybrid” case involving both free exercise and parents’ rights to
direct the upbringing of their children.195
Relying on cases such as Pierce and Yoder, parents may argue that their
constitutional rights to control the upbringing of their children and to freely exercise their
religion are infringed when they send their children to private, religious school and the
public school district refuses to provide the special education services the children would
receive if the parents had enrolled them in public school. So far, such arguments have
not been successful. In 2004, the First Circuit Court of Appeals turned away a suit
contending that failure to provide the full range of special education services and
procedural rights for a child in a private, religious school violates the constitutional
guarantees of substantive due process, equal protection, and free exercise of religion, as
well as federal statutory law.196 The court in Gary S. v. Manchester School District
reasoned that the parents’ unquestioned constitutional right to educate their child in a
private, religious school did not entail a constitutional right to public funding for the
child’s education, including special education services that would otherwise be provided
if the child were in public school.197 The court supported its position by citing cases such
as Harris v. McRae,198 in which the Supreme Court ruled that although women have the
fundamental right to an abortion, women who cannot afford the abortion need not be
provided funding under the Medicaid program to obtain one, even when Medicaid funded
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all other medically necessary services.199
Parents of private school children may question the reasoning in Gary S., insisting
that the denial of services that would cost the school district the same if the child were in
public school constitutes a penalty for parental compliance with religious duties or
exercise of control over upbringing. The school district, meanwhile, would defend the
denial as a decision simply not to subsidize the free exercise of religion or the
childrearing choices of the parent. The parents of a child with disabilities are treated no
differently from the parents of a child without disabilities. Both sets of families are
denied the full set of public school services they would receive if the child were enrolled
in public school.
There is, of course, an exceedingly fine line between a penalty and denial of a
subsidy.200 In this instance, however, a distinction should be drawn. The statutes in
Meyer, Pierce, and Yoder all imposed criminal sanctions for exercise of religious liberty
or parental autonomy. Thus they clearly fell on the penalty side. Failure to provide
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funding for services is different. The Gary S. court’s analogy to the abortion funding
controversy is apt. Roe v. Wade201 overturned criminal penalties on abortion before fetal
viability and declared abortion a fundamental constitutional right, but Harris v. McRae202
upheld denial of funding even when the state provided payment for childbirth and all
other medically needed services. It identified the denial as a permissible failure to
provide a subsidy rather than an unconstitutional imposition of a penalty.203 Harris v.
McRae is itself subject to criticism,204 but as long as it stands, it is a far closer comparison
to the denial of special education services for private school students than the criminal
penalty cases are. The parents in Meyer, Pierce and Yoder were not demanding free
instruction, even though the government provided free instruction to all in public school.
They were demanding freedom from criminal penalties.
Unless private school children have a constitutional right to the wide variety of
services that public school districts furnish public school students (or at least could
furnish at no greater cost than when provided to public school children), they have no
constitutional right to equal special education services. Bus transportation to and from
school, books and materials, access to laboratory facilities, participation in sports teams
are all denied to private school children unless the school district affirmatively chooses to
furnish them. No credible authority has ever hinted that there is a constitutional
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obligation to provide these goods. As Gary S. noted, the implication of the parents’
position in that case was that public funding of all religious education is required,
because the failure to provide funding equal to that given public school children similarly
burdens the choice to educate in a sectarian school.205 The First Circuit decision mirrors
those of many other courts that have rejected free exercise arguments regarding the denial
of special education services to students in religious schools.206
Some scholars have put forward approaches to the unconstitutional conditions
problem that do not rely on penalty-subsidy distinctions, arguing, for example, that
government denial of benefits should be found unconstitutional when improper
governmental motive is present or denial of the benefit is coercive.207 These approaches
yield the same conclusion that denial of equal special education services is
constitutionally permissible. No improper motive is evident. The government is not
trying to engage in suppression of religion or the supplanting of parental authority.
Government is merely allocating resources in a way that supports what it has traditionally
supported and finds most convenient to support. Conditioning of full special education
services on enrollment in public school is difficult to describe as coercion when so many
parents continue to educate their children privately.
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B.

Religious Viewpoint Discrimination
A variation on the constitutional issue is presented when the district or the state

permits private school children at non-sectarian schools to receive publicly funded
special education services on site, but forbids children at private religious schools from
receiving them on the sites of their schools. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the
University of Virginia208 held in 1995 that a state university could not permissibly
discriminate against a student religious organization in funding its printing costs when it
funded the printing costs of various other student organizations. The disparate treatment
constituted viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment’s free speech
guarantee.209 Elsewhere, the Court has asserted that government violates religious free
exercise rights when it singles out religion for negative treatment.210 A policy that funds
on-site services in secular schools but not sectarian ones seems to contradict these
principles.
In Peter v. Wedl,211 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the case of a
child with quadriplegia and other disabilities who needed a paraprofessional aide while in
school. The child attended a Christian school until the parents’ private funding for the
aide ran out, then transferred to a public school.212 For part of the relevant time period,
Minnesota law barred public school districts from providing services at sectarian schools,
although it permitted them to provide services at nonreligious private schools.213 After
the regulation was enjoined, the school district still maintained an apparent de facto
208
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policy of funding aide services only at nonsectarian private schools.214 The court ruled
that the Minnesota regulation violated the plaintiff family’s rights of free exercise of
religion, free speech, and equal protection. 215 It remanded for development of similar
claims based on the de facto policy, if it were found to exist.216 The court ruled that the
discrimination could not be justified on the ground of avoiding an establishment clause
violation, in light of decisions such as Zobrest and Agostini permitting on-site services in
religious schools.217
If Gary S. and Peter v. Wedl are both credited, the conclusion is that a public
school district may deny on-site services to children in private schools, but that it must do
so across the board, without regard to the religious nature of the school at which the
services are denied. Fear of entanglement or other establishment of religion does not
justify discrimination against provision of services at the religious institution. The
Constitution does not forbid refusal to fund private school services in general, but
selecting whom to fund on the basis of whether the school is religious violates
constitutional principles of nondiscrimination articulated in Rosenberger.
Peter’s validity (and, conversely, Rosenberger’s reach) may be subject to
question, however, in light of Locke v. Davey, 218 the 2004 Supreme Court decision that
rejected a free exercise challenge to the constitutionality of refusal to provide a student a
post-secondary scholarship for religious study even when public scholarship aid was
provided to students enrolled in other collegiate programs. The Davey Court
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acknowledged that awarding a scholarship to the student to study devotional theology
was permissible under the establishment clause of the First Amendment.219 At the same
time, the Court stressed that the denial of the funds did not impose sanctions on religious
practice,220 or even force individuals to choose between their beliefs and receiving a
government benefit: “The State has merely chosen not to fund a distinct category of
instruction.”221 The Court distinguished Rosenberger on the ground that the scholarship
program was not a forum for speech, and it dismissed an equal protection argument on
the ground that without a fee exercise violation, the categories created by the law called
for nothing more than rational basis review.222 The Court placed special weight on the
tradition of prohibiting the use of public funds to train religious ministers.223 The
Supreme Court’s decision has been applied to permit government to deny support for
instruction in religious high schools. In a recent case concerning general, rather than
special, education, the First Circuit Court of Appeals relied on Davey in ruling that Maine
did not violate the equal protection clause by failing to provide tuition payments to
private sectarian secondary schools on behalf of students when it made the payments
available to private nonsectarian secondary schools.224
Some scholars’ interpretations of Locke v. Davey would imply that the case
completely overrules Peter, and extends Gary S. so significantly as to permit school
systems to selectively deny funding for special education services for children in
religious schools. Professor Laycock notes that “The plaintiff’s claim . . . was a
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straightforward application of recent precedents. But Davey involved an important
competing principle: there is very little that the government is constitutionally required
to fund.”225 He goes on to state that “As written, [the opinion] applies only to funding the
training of clergy, but it may well be extended to all funding decisions, including
discriminatory refusals to fund secular services or instruction delivered by religious
institutions.”226 Other commentators view the case as making substantial inroads on the
principle of neutrality expounded in Rosenberger and referred to in various free exercise
cases.227
Davey need not be given so broad a reading. The Court emphasized that the
scholarship program it upheld nevertheless permitted students to attend pervasively
religious schools.228 All the law barred was training for the distinctly religious profession
of becoming a minister. The analogy would thus perhaps permit the school district to
refuse to provide publicly funded special education services at a high school that is a
seminary or convent, but not to refuse to furnish the services at an ordinary elementary or
secondary school that has a religious orientation. But this reading is by no means the
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only one a court may adopt. If the public schools do not need to meet a neutrality
standard and the provision of specialized services is not viewed as a forum for speech, a
case such as Peter is without support. Whether this is considered a good or a bad thing
may depend more than anything else on the perspective of the person engaging in the
consideration.
V. Concerns About Administrative Arbitrariness
The federal law and its interpretations create a large number of regulatory
requirements for school districts in their provision of services to children in private
schools. But they also vest tremendous amounts of unreviewable decision making power
in the public school districts. The Constitution is not totally silent regarding these
exercises of power. Although IDEA gives license for arbitrary allocations of special
education resources among children in private schools, Fourteenth Amendment due
process doctrine requires at least a minimal degree of transparency in how the resources
are to be distributed.
A.

Risks of Arbitrary Decision Making
As Congress has enacted it, the Department of Education has implemented it, and

the courts have interpreted it, IDEA’s private school student regime features numerous
openings for purely arbitrary decision making on the part of public school districts.
There is no individual entitlement to services at all, much less to an individually
proportional amount of the resources available to all private school children. There are
no hearing rights to challenge decisions to give or withhold services. Under the federal
law, services may, but need not, be delivered on site, even if the services are those that
cannot sensibly be provided off site, such as sign language interpretation or a personal
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aide. The law requires school districts to consult with private school representatives, but
it specifies nothing about what must emerge from the consultation process, short of an
affirmation that the consultation itself occurred. Indeed, the whole consultation process
sounds more like an exercise in interest group politics229 than in rational policy making.
The law affords no protection from discrimination against children in religious schools,
apart from precedent that is now of questionable soundness. The current interpretation of
the law by the Department of Education grants license for withholding all services from
home-schooled children.
As a general rule, guarantees of fairness in government decisions are not very
robust. Under current doctrine, Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and substantive
due process require that the categories employed in legislation or regulations bear at least
a rational relationship to legitimate governmental ends, even if the ends are hypothetical
ones.230 The test, however, is elastic,231 and the discriminations occasioned by the private
school provisions may well survive this minimal scrutiny.232 Procedural due process
rights to notice and hearing before a neutral decision maker might be asserted in an effort
to avoid unfair denial of services, but current doctrine establishes that those rights apply
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only when an individual has an entitlement to liberty or property.233 If nothing else is
clear, it is that Congress and the Department of Education have worked hard to avoid
creating any individual entitlement to services. Government decisions to act in a more
general fashion are not subject to hearing rights or other ordinary requirements of
procedural due process.234
B.

Due Process Protections
There is, nevertheless, another thread of due process doctrine apart from ordinary

procedural due process and minimal scrutiny substantive due process that requires some
base level of transparency in government administration of benefits.235 The doctrine
demands at the very least that government largess be distributed pursuant to standards
that are written down and publicly available.236 In White v. Roughton,237 the Seventh
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Circuit Court of Appeals found a violation of due process when a township administrator
of general assistance awarded or denied benefits without any published standards of
eligibility or amounts of aid.238 The court declared that “due process requires that
welfare assistance be administered to ensure fairness and freedom from arbitrary
decision-making as to eligibility.”239 The court went on to state:
Defendant Roughton as administrator of the general assistance program
has the responsibility to administer the program to ensure the fair and
consistent application of eligibility requirements. Fair and consistent
application of such requirements requires that Roughton establish written
standards and regulations. At the hearing in the district court . . .
defendant Roughton admitted that he and his staff determine eligibility
based on their own unwritten personal standards. . . . Such a procedure,
vesting virtually unfettered discretion in Roughton and his staff, is clearly
violative of due process.240
The court did not rest its interpretation on the conclusion that the applicants for
benefits had an entitlement to benefits.241 Indeed, because the standards were ad hoc and
unwritten, it is dubious whether there was anything anyone could term an entitlement.
Although the court cited the statute establishing the assistance program, it conceded that
under state law grants might be provided on a one-time-only basis, rather than as a stream
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of income,242 which was the indicator of a protected property interest in other due process
welfare cases.243
White v. Roughton is hardly an isolated case. It relied on a prominent Second
Circuit decision in which the court found a claim for violation of due process when the
plaintiffs alleged that a public housing authority failed to adopt standards for selection of
prospective tenants.244 That court stated:
It hardly need be said that the existence of an absolute and uncontrolled
discretion in an agency of government vested with the administration of a
vast program, such as public housing, would be an intolerable invitation to
abuse. . . . For this reason alone due process requires that selections
among applicants be made in accordance with ‘ascertainable standards’ . .
. .245
Just last year, a court applied this line of authority in finding a violation of due process
when District of Columbia officials terminated or modified disability compensation
benefits of employees without adopting and consistently applying written standards for
the decisions.246
Applied to the topic of special education services for private school students, this
doctrine dictates that public school districts must establish written, publicly available
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standards for allocating services among private school children. The services do not need
to be equal to those provided the children in public schools, but they must be awarded or
withheld on the basis of some sensible and discernable system. Degrees of need might be
taken into account, and costs of providing services do not have to be ignored.247 But
purely arbitrary decision making must be avoided. This principle should apply as well to
provision of services on the sites or off the sites of private schools and in religious
schools and secular schools. If distinctions are made, the school district must make them
pursuant to a written, public policy that can be justified on the basis of relevant
educational or administrative considerations, and not on the basis of whim or prejudice
against some class of students.
The approach taken here reaches a conclusion parallel to that reached by
Professors Shapiro and Levy in their recent article regarding government benefits and due
process,248 even if the means to the results differ in some respects. Whereas the approach
outlined here identifies a thread of due process doctrine separate from ordinary noticeand-hearing procedural due process and rational basis substantive due process, Shapiro
and Levy contend that that due process doctrine in general took a wrong turn when in the
1970s the Supreme Court began to insist on identifying an entitlement before requiring
that withholding or termination of a government benefit had to be subject to procedural
due process rights of notice and hearing.249 Shapiro and Levy would have courts
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abandon the rigidity of contemporary procedural due process doctrine to recognize that
decisions regarding distribution of benefits should be subject to legal standards, and that
due process rights should attach when the government takes action adverse to an
individual concerning eligibility under those legal standards.250 Shapiro and Levy would
correct the doctrine’s path; the approach suggested here merely points out that all along,
the path has been broader than may have been appreciated. But applied to the issue of
publicly funded special education services for children in private schools, both
approaches demand written standards that make sensible allocations and are available for
public scrutiny.
CONCLUSION
Private school children do not gain an individual entitlement to special education
services under the new federal law, but the more elaborate statutory provisions calling for
identification of the children and proportionate spending could possibly cause more of
those children to receive a more extensive array of services. Moreover, what the federal
law does not furnish, state law may provide. Constitutional claims to an individual
entitlement to special education services equivalent to what public school children
receive lack support, be they claims of religious free exercise rights or rights to control
the upbringing of one’s children. A potential due process problem does arise, however,
because the federal law grants public school administrators such a degree of unchecked
authority that arbitrary and unfair decisions are a serious risk. The problem demands a
response in the form of written, public, and reasonable standards for the provision of the
special education services to children in private schools.
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